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LESSONS FROM KATRINA: RESPONSE, RECOVERY AND
THE PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE
Elizabeth A. Weeks*
I. INTRODUCTION
Hurricane Katrina left many challenges and troubles in its wake,
including a crisis for the region's health care system, which amply
demonstrated the need to improve disaster preparedness for the nation's
emergency medical providers. New Orleans's two large public
hospitals have been closed since the storm. Essential medical records
have been lost or destroyed. Pre-Katrina, half of the region's
population lacked health insurance.' The numbers of uninsured and
* Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. The author wishes to
acknowledge Michele Goodwin for coordinating the symposium and inviting me to
speak. This paper also benefited greatly from comments of my symposium co-
panelists, Moderator David Guinn, J. Elaine Garrett, Karen G. Gervais, and Mark
Lies. Additional insights are attributable to Dr. Richard A. Frankenstein and Dr.
James Aiken, my co-panelists on Disaster Management: Preparing for a New
Reality, at the American Medical Association, Organized Medical Staff Section
educational program, June 9, 2006, Chicago, Illinois. Finally, special appreciation to
James Hodge, Executive Director, Center for Law and the Public's Health at
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, for sharing his considerable research on
the health care disaster planning.
' See Claudia Kalb & Andrew Murr, The Cost of the Katrina Effect; The Wind and
Rain Have Died Down. But the Hurricane Left Behind a Toxic Health-Care Crisis,
MSNBC.com, Dec. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10350481/site/newsweek/from/ET/ (last visited Sept.
20, 2006) (discussing various facets of health care crisis facing Gulf Coast region
after Hurricane Katrina, including closure of Charity and University hospitals); Todd
Zwillich, Sens. Back Full Katrina Medical Payments, UPI, Sept. 12, 2005, at
http://www.menafn .com/qn-news-story.asp?Storyld=CqYt9qeidDxmTA2fOCMLUys
1TzwrPy2fPz (last visited Sept. 20, 2006) (discussing broad impact for public health
and health care delivery in Gulf region, post-Katrina and quoting Ray Scheppach,
executive director of National Governor's Association: "We've got to go in and
almost rebuild and [sic] entire infrastructure, a health infrastructure, in that particular
area"); see also Transcript: National Public Radio, Morning Edition, New Orleans'
Emergency Rooms Overtaxed, Alix Spiegel, reporting (Jan. 27, 2006) (on file with
author) [hereinafter NPR Transcript], available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5174379 (last visited Sept. 20,
2006) (describing ongoing emergency health care crisis in New Orleans, with many
area hospitals disabled by Hurricane Katrina); see also Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured, Addressing the Health Care Impact of Hurricane
Katrina, Policy Brief, Report no. 7387, Sept. 13, 2005 [hereinafter Kaiser Report
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destitute rose dramatically in the storm's wake as employers were
wiped out and, with them, Gulf Coast residents' employer health
insurance.2 Without access to medical services or health insurance,
many people were unable to receive necessary treatment, often
exacerbating underlying chronic health conditions. Accordingly, the
need for medical intervention became even more acute. For health care
providers, Katrina's impact is not limited to physical destruction of
facilities and buildings. The increased demand for services and
increased numbers of uninsured patients creates a severe strain on
capacity, particularly for emergency services. 3  The impact extends
beyond providers in the flood zone to neighboring states that have
taken in the storm's victims. Those host states bear the increased
demand from destitute, newly uninsured patients and patients enrolled
in out-of-state private and government health plans.4
Following the September 11, 2001 ("9/11") attacks on the
Pentagon and World Trade Towers, federal and state authorities turned
great attention to the nation's disaster preparedness. Many of the laws
passed and proposed after 9/11 focused on preparing to respond to
public health emergencies. Despite those efforts, Katrina provided
vivid lessons about the nation's remaining deficiencies in disaster
response planning. The next terrorist attack, bioterrorism disease
outbreak, or natural disaster is likely to produce serious, widespread
7387], available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7387-2.pdf (last visited Sept.
20, 2006) (detailing pre-Katrina poverty levels in region and impact of catastrophe).
2 See Kaiser Report 7387, supra note 1, at 1 (estimating that 400,000 jobs were lost
and noting that many who lost jobs lost "not only their source of income but also the
health insurance coverage that their former employers offered").
3 See Kaiser Report 7387, supra note 1, at 2 (noting closure "Big Charity" Hospital,
the largest public hospital in New Orleans and Level I trauma center for Gulf Coast
region); see also Robin Rudowitz et al., Health Care in the New Orleans Before and
After Hurricane Katrina, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Aug. 29, 2006, at 2 (describing region's
health care infrastructure and Charity Hospital's central role in serving a "largely
poor, predominately minority population" and very high rates of emergency
department visits) abstract available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/25/5/w393.
4 Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid Facts, A Comparison
of Ten Approved Katrina Waivers, Policy Brief, Report no. 7420, Oct. 21, 2005
[hereinafter Kaiser Report 7420], available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7420.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2006) (noting that
individuals enrolled in Medicaid and SCHIP in their "home" states would have to
enroll in the "host" states to receive assistance and that "host" state providers cannot
be compensated by "home" states); Rudowitz, supra note 3, at 4 (describing Medicaid
and other insurance coverage in Louisiana and evacuee states, including Texas,
Georgia, and Ohio).
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injuries and casualties. Therefore, health care providers play a crucial
role in disaster planning. Much additional planning, forethought, and
funding needs to be implemented before the next catastrophe, to meet
the immediate medical needs of the disaster victims and secure
adequate resources to both treat disaster victims and return to normal
operations after the crisis has passed.5
II. CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS
Health care disaster planning is challenging for many reasons,
including the difficulty predicting the precise timing, impact, and cost
of the next catastrophe. A natural disaster impacts society, the
economy, and the health care system differently from a terrorist attack.
A sudden, single episode attack imposes different challenges than an
emerging or episodic crisis, such as infectious disease outbreak or
release of a biological agent. Moreover, the underlying health,
economic, and social conditions of the geographic region hit by the
terrorist attack or natural disaster alter response priorities and needs.
6
But common themes run through all disaster scenarios: First, meeting
the needs of the population as a whole, rather than a single individual
victim; second, coordinating the response among disjointed
government authorities at both the national and state level.
A. Cost of Catastrophes
A brief survey of economic figures from a few recent disasters
illustrates the difficulty predicting and measuring the impact of the next
catastrophe. Moreover, the numbers change rapidly as the episode
evolves and new information is acquired. For example, initial
estimates of Katrina's insured losses in the days immediately after the
storm were $26 billion at the high end.7 Later estimates have been as
5 See Laura Landro, Hospitals Step Up Disaster-Preparedness, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6,
2006, at D4 (citing recent Institute of Medicine report and noting that despite "all the
progress in improving readiness, experts warn there is still a long way to go" and that
many hospitals are so overcrowded "that they can barely handle a multiple car crash,
let alone mass casualties").
6 See Landro, supra note 5, at D4 (citing experts' warning that regions of the U.S.
should prioritize disaster preparedness efforts based on the type of events they might
likely face, rather than rely on "all hazards" programs).
7 See, e.g., Mike Comerford, Allstate Mobilizes Adjusters for Hurricane Claims,
CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, Aug. 30, 2005, at BI (citing insurance industry's initial
storm damage estimates, before levees broke, between $10 billion and $26 billion);
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high as $200 billion. 8  Even the early, grossly underestimated $26
billion figure would have exceeded the costs of any previous natural
disasters in the United States, including Hurricane Andrew in 1992, at
$20 billion, and the 2004 hurricane season with several Florida storms,
which losses totaled $22 billion. The 1994 Northridge earthquake in
California caused $16 insured losses.9  As one commentator noted:
"Hurricane Katrina broke America's heart. No previous natural
disaster exacted a greater toll." 10
Before Katrina, the 9/11 terrorist attack was the costliest U.S.
disaster. Total costs of the World Trade Center attack alone, leaving
aside the separate plane crash and Pentagon attack, are estimated
between $33 to $36 billion, including lost earnings, property damage,
and Ground Zero clean-up and restoration."l Close to 3,000 people lost
their lives in the attack, resulting in estimated $7.8 billion total lost
Scott Miller, Katrina Damages Piling Up; Some Estimates as High as $16 Billion;
State Farm Ready, PANTAGRAPH, Aug. 30, 2005, at C1 (reporting various estimates,
ranging from low of 4$ billion to high of $16 billion); Scott Miller, Katrina Claims
Pass '04 Storms, PANTAGRAPH, Sept. 3, 2005, at A10 (reporting, just a few days after
the storm and levee breaks, that Hurricane Katrina had already resulted in more
insurance claims than any storm of 2004).
8 Impact of Hurricane on 2007 Budget: Hearing before the House Budget Committee,
109th Cong. 7, 28-29 (2005), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/budget/index.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2006) (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office)
[hereinafter Holz-Eakin testimony]; see also David Wyss, A Second Look at Katrina's
Cost, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2005, at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2005/nf2005O913_8975_db082.ht
m (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) ("The damage done by Katrina to the U.S. economy is
still unknown, but it's clearly more than first expected, with estimated costs now as
high as $200 billion").
9 See Jesse Westbrook, Hurricane Could Cost Insurers $60 Billion, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Sept. 10, 2005, at C1 (comparing previous disasters to Hurricane Katrina,
including $20.8 billion insured losses from Hurricane Andrew in 1992, $16 billion
from the Northridge earthquake in 1994, and $22 billion from the four hurricanes that
hit Central Florida in 2004). Converted for inflation, total losses for Hurricane
Andrew are estimated at $38.5 billion, and $48.7 billion for the Northridge
earthquake. See Holz-Eakin testimony, supra note 8, at 14-15 (testifying that total
insured and uninsured losses from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita approach $140 billion
and noting that amount far surpasses recent natural disaster costs, even converted to
today's dollars).
10 DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND
BEYOND 1 (2006).
11 See Jason Bram, et al., Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New
York City, FRBNY EcON. POL'Y REv. 5 (Nov. 2002) (estimating losses as of June
2002).
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lifetime earnings.1 2  By contrast, the tsunami that struck eleven
countries in South Asia on December 26, 2004, caused a devastating
human toll of 300,000 dead or missing but only $8.4 billion in
damages. 13 Six hundred and ninety hospitals and health care clinics
were destroyed.14 The relatively modest damages from the tsunami
reflect the fact that much of the property loss was uninsured and the
underdeveloped insurance markets in the effected countries. 1
5
Biological, chemical, or other infectious disease-causing agents
would produce different response challenges and costs than a single-
episode natural disaster or terrorist attack.16  Data on the financial
impact for health care providers for a recent public health emergency
were compiled following the Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome
("SARS") outbreak in Toronto, Canada. The 108-day outbreak during
the summer of 2003 cost health care facilities $945 million, according
to Ontario's Minister of Health. The total includes $395 million in
hospital costs, including staff and supplies; $330 million in health care
worker costs, including wage-replacement for quarantined workers; and
$100 million in lost revenues to hospitals affected by the SARS
12 See id. at 14 (summarizing losses as estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of New
York).
13 Michael VanRooyen & Jennifer Leaning, Perspective: After the Tsunami - Facing
Public Health Challenges, 325:5 NEW ENG. J. MED. 435, 435 (Feb. 3, 2005) (noting
that "[t]he devastation wrought by the tsunami was catastrophic - more than 150,000
people dead, tens of thousands of people missing, thousands of miles of destroyed
coastline, and loss of livelihood for millions of distraught survivors"); Robert Willis,
Tsunami Had Little Fiscal Impact, SALT LAKE TRIB., April 13, 2005 (citing
International Monetary Fund estimates for the region).
14 Peter Fritsch, Cleaning Up After the Tsunami, An ACEH Surprise: Good
Government, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2005, at Al (reporting on tsunami aftermath); see
also Denise Gracy, Even Good Health System is Overwhelmed by Tsunami, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, at 10 (discussing public health outreach following destruction of
clinics and hospitals).
15See Insurance Information Institute, Asian EarthQuake and Tsunami, An Insurance
Perspective 2 (March 29, 2005), at
http://server.iii.org/yy-obj-data/binary/738638-1 0/AsiaEarthquakeTsunami.pdf#sea
rch=%22asian%20earthquake%20and%20tsunami%2C%20an%20insurance%20pers
pective%22 (last visited Sept. 22, 2006) (noting, as an example, that Indonesians
spent average of $8 per capita on non-life insurance in 2003, compared to $1,980 per
capita in the United States).
16 See generally Donald A. Henderson, The Looming Threat of Bioterrorism, 283
SCIENCE 1279 (1999) (describing potential agents and perpetrators and most
threatening scenarios).
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outbreak. In addition, $120 million was spent on disease-tracking,
rapid-response teams, and other preparedness for future attacks. 
17
Despite the particular impact of the next disaster, certain
common themes emerge that challenge policymakers' and health care
providers' planning and response. First, disaster response requires
thinking in terms of populations, not individuals. The population-
based, public health approach may be unfamiliar or even antithetical to
traditional medical treatment models. The demand surge likely to
follow a natural, terrorist, or other disaster would quickly overwhelm
health care supplies, facilities, funding, and personnel. Accordingly,
medical workers and health department authorities need to consider
how to ration and prioritize scare resources for the collective benefit of
the entire affected population, even, at times, compromising the best
medical outcome for an individual patient.
In addition to adopting public health models, disaster planners
must face core constitutional values, namely, federalism. Emergency
response calls for coordination among different levels of federal, state,
and local governments and private actors. Federal and state
governments share responsibility for disaster response, but the lines of
authority are not clearly delineated. The federalist structure of
government presents challenges for disaster management because state
and federal governments each may justifiably claim authority for the
response. Worse still, federal and state authorities may each disclaim
ultimate responsibility for the catastrophe, pointing fingers at one
another in an endless blame-game, as occurred during Katrina. The
federalist system also requires coordination among separate state
governments. A disaster may impact several states, each of which has
separate sovereign authority and discretion to enact different, even
conflicting, legal requirements and policy priorities for emergency
management.
17 See Ontario Presses Ottawa to Foot SARS Bill, CBC NEWS, June 26, 2003,
available at
http://www.cbc.ca/story/news/national/2003/O6/27/sars-compensationO30627.html
(last visited Sept. 22, 2006) (tabulating recovery costs, including quarantine
compensation, job recovery, and tourism attraction); see also Ontario Ministry of
Finance, ONTARiO FINANCES, 2003 - 04 First Quarter, Quarterly Update (June 30,
2003), available at http://www.gov.on.ca/FIN/english/engfinances.htm (reporting
financial impact of SARS a $1,073, all as Ontario spending, without federal support);
Kristin Choo, The Avian Flu Time Bomb, ABA JOURNAL, Nov. 2005, at 39
(comparing emerging Avian Flu threat to SARS episode, which outbreak was
contained due to quick action by public health authorities in affected countries and
fact that "SARS, unlike most human influenza viruses, was not very contagious").
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B. Health Care Versus Public Health
A catastrophe like Katrina calls for a broad range of public health
activities. Natural or terrorist disasters on the order of Katrina or 9/11
inflict widespread human injury, creating a sudden, unprecedented
demand for medical care. The ultimate tragedy of 9/11, however, was
that the injuries were almost all fatal, leaving ready and willing health
care providers with no victims to treat, only bodies to be recovered and
identified. Katrina's wrath both inflicted new, immediate emergency
needs and seriously exacerbated existing conditions, with lasting,
devastating effects for the region's health care infrastructure. Before
describing the range of emergency medical response activities relevant
to disaster response, it is important to recognize the conceptual
distinction between "health care" and "public health."
In responding to a major catastrophe, emergency medical
providers must abandon their familiar approach to health care delivery.
Instead of focusing on caring for one patient at a time, providers should
switch to consider the best, overall outcome for disaster victims
collectively. 18 Medical professionals will need to think beyond the
patient-physician treatment relationship central to providing "health
care." "Health" suggests a "personal, medical matter, a state of
freedom from pathology achieved by an individual through the
mediation of a doctor."' 19 Physicians diagnose, treat, and provide
medical care to their patients. The standard of care strives for the best
health outcome possible for an individual patient, irrespective of who
else is in the waiting room.
"Public health," by contrast, focuses on the welfare or safety of
an entire population, an approach that may require compromising
'8 See Scott Burris, The Indivisibility of Public Health: Population-Level Measures in
Politics of Market Individualism, 87 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1607 - 10 (1997)
reprinted in LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS: A READER 41,
44 (2002) (defining "public health, by contrast" as "an attribute of communities in
social and physical environments," which "ideally, includes not just a high level of
well-being for some but its even distribution throughout a society"); see generally
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking
Individual Rights and Common Goods, 21 HEALTH AFF. 79 (Nov./Dec. 2002) (urging
need for reorientation toward communitarian principles of public health); Andrew W.
Siegel, The Jurisprudence of Public Health: Reflections on Lawrence 0. Gostin's
Public Health Law, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 359, 361 - 62 (2001)
(describing Gostin's distinction, "Public health law is concerned with the state's role
in advancing the health of the community, whereas health care law is concerned with
the 'microrelationships between health care providers and patients"').
19 Burris, supra note 18, at 44.
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individual health outcomes for the greater good of the community at
large. 20 The Institute of Medicine suggests: "Public health is what we,
as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be
healthy.",21 Public health seeks more than the aggregation of individual
22
satisfaction but, rather, the communal good. In many instances,
public health policy is determined by the reality of scarce resources-
time, money, personnel, beds, drugs, supplies, and equipment. The
objective is to allocate resources most efficiently, in the best interest of
the collective population. As a result of that rationing calculus,
individual rights and interests necessarily are in tension with
communitarian interests.23 For example, public health strategies allow
an infected patient's freedom of movement or personal autonomy to be
severely restricted by quarantine or mandatory vaccination to avoid
exposing the rest of the population to infection. Likewise, under a
public health model, one person's condition may be allowed to
deteriorate while another victim's more pressing medical needs are
addressed, contrary to the individual patient standard of care.2 4
20 See Gostin, supra note 18, at 81 (describing "alternative philosophical tradition that
sees individuals primarily as members of communities... with each individual reliant
on the others for health and security").
21 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988); see
LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS: A READER 2 (2002) (citing
same); see generally Burris, supra note 18, at 45.
22 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health of the People: The Highest Law? 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 509, 510 (2004) ("The field of public health would profit from a vibrant
conception of 'the common' that sees public interests as more than the aggregation of
individual interests").
23 See generally GOSTIN, supra note 21, at 67-93 (chapter on "Public Health Ethics:
The Communitarian Tradition").
24 Physicians and other professionals must exercise the kind and degree of learning,
skill, and ability of an ordinary member of the profession. See RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 299A (defining professional standard for negligence); see, e.g., Keebler v.
Winfield Carraway Hosp., 531 So.2d 841, 845 (Ala. 1988) (defining physicians' duty
to "exercise such reasonable care, diligence, and skill as reasonably competent
physicians" in the relevant medical community would exercise in the same or similar
circumstances"). Generally, a "hospital rendering emergency treatment is obligated
to do that which is immediately and reasonably necessary for the preservation of life,
limb or health of the patient." New Biloxi Hosp., Inc. v. Frazier, 146 So.2d 882
(Miss. 1962). Moreover, the fact that a physician lacks equipment, training, or
capability to treat a patient properly does not excuse failure to exercise due care.
Rather, the physician should refer the patient to a competent physician. See DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 636, 638 (2000) (citing cases involving chiropractors).
Once a physician-patient relationship is established, a physician may have an ongoing
duty to treat and, thereby, be found liable for refusal to treat, unless the physician
gives proper notice and withdrawal. See, e.g., Payton v. Weaver, 131 Cal. App.3d 38,
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C. State Versus Federal Powers
Much controversy and the finger pointing and blame-game that
followed Katrina stemmed from failure to coordinate local, state, and
federal response. It was devastatingly unclear which authorities-state
or federal-assumed ultimate responsibility for disaster management.
2 5
The federalism "turf war" that crippled Katrina response and threatens
to undermine the effectiveness of future disaster response is a product
26of our federal system, enshrined in the Tenth Amendment. The
framers of the Federal Constitution designed a system of checks and
balances not only horizontally among the three branches of government
but also vertically between the federal and state governments. The
Tenth Amendment checks the centralized, federal power by securing all
reserved, traditional state powers to the separate sovereign states.
Federal authority is limited to constitutionally enumerated powers and
laws that Congress enacts under those powers.2 7  Public health
45 (Cal. App. 1982) (finding proper withdrawal even though patient suffered from
end-stage renal disease and faced difficulty finding alternative provider). The
professional standard does not seem to take into account competing needs of other
patients. In summary, the existence of a catastrophic public health emergency,
however, might be a relevant "circumstance" that the jury could consider. See Dep't
of HHS, Health Resources and Services Administration, Healthcare Systems Bureau,
Division of Healthcare Preparedness, Emergency System for Advance Registration of
Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) - Legal and Regulatory Issues, Draft
Report, at 42 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter ESAR-VHP Draft], available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Research/Affprojects.htm#HRSA (last visited Sept.
22, 2006) (suggesting that "circumstances related to the emergency as a whole play a
factor in establishing the standard of care for physicians and medical staff rendering
care").
25 See U.S. GAO, Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, Report No. GAO-06-365R (Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter GAO Report
No. 06-365R], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06365r.pdf (last visited
Sept. 22, 2006) (suggesting need for clear, decisive leadership, in single individual
accountable to the President); see also FARBER & CHEN, supra note 10, at 19 (noting
that "the public came to believe that a divided, disorganized official response
aggravated the impact of the storm and deepened the injury suffered by Katrina's
most vulnerable victims").
26 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST., AMEND. X.
27 U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8 (listing Congress's enumerated powers); see, e.g., Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (explaining general principles of
field and conflict preemption by which
Congress may displace states' reserved powers).
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authorities typically follow orders from state governors, acting on their
reserved police powers to protect public health, safety, and welfare.
28
Federal authority to respond to disasters derives from enumerated
commerce, spending, or national security powers as stated in the
Constitution or enacted by Congress. 29
The federalist system presents challenges for disaster
management. A local disaster may have a broad economic,
humanitarian, or emotional impact on the entire nation, thus calling for
centralized response at the federal level. A regional disaster, such as
Katrina, may cross state lines and thus call for separate responses from
the affected states. The impact on states and their approaches to
emergency response and disaster planning may vary widely. Moreover,
states may have difficulty coordinating legal, emergency, public health,
and other systems within and among their borders. Therefore, federal
oversight and coordination might be beneficial to the recovery effort.
30
But federal authority for emergency response is limited and
subject to interpretation. 31  Without clear congressional or
constitutional authority, federal authorities may exceed their
enumerated powers and encroach on traditional state authority. Other
practical considerations counsel in favor of allowing state and local
governments to take primary responsibility for disaster response. Local
responders are closer to the scene and more familiar with their citizens'
needs than detached federal authorities. Accordingly, they are uniquely
positioned on the ground to assess and respond. 3  Decentralized state
agencies may also be faster, more nimble, and better able to access
information and resources than large federal agencies. Imagine, for
28 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (describing states' "immense mass of
legislation" for public health and safety); Gostin, supra note 18, at 86 (suggesting that
"states have 'plenary' authority to protect the public's health under their reserved
powers in the Tenth Amendment").
29 See Gostin, supra note 18, at 86 (noting that "the federal government, under the
national defense or commerce powers of the Constitution, is entitled to act in the
context of multistate threats to health and security").
30 See GAO Report No. 06-365R, supra note 25, at 3 ("As we recommended in 1993,
we continue to believe that a single individual directly responsible and accountable to
the President must be designated to act as the central focal point to lead and
coordinate the overall federal response in the event of a major catastrophe").
31 See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (describing authority of President and
Secretary of Health and Human Services to declare emergencies under various
statutory definitions).
32 See Gostin, supra note 18, at 87 (suggesting that "[s]tates and localities probably
would be the first to detect and respond to a health emergency and would have a key
role throughout").
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example, the effect of replacing local fire departments with a central,
federal fire authority. The response would be utterly ineffective for
even a routine house-fire not to mention widespread conflagration.
Consider the bureaucratic delay that would result as federal authorities
receive notification of the emergency, approve federal intervention,
deploy federal firefighters, and transport personnel to the emergency
location. This example might seem far-fetched until one considers
similar, heretofore unthinkable delays and problems in federal response
to the Gulf Coast emergency after Katrina.33
In addition to federal-state coordination, a federally declared
disaster would also call for response from numerous, disconnected
federal agencies and divisions. A different sort of turf war could ensue
without a plan for coordination and mutual support among agencies and
branches of the federal government. Recognizing those issues, the
Bush administration passed a range of disaster preparedness legislation
following the 9/11 attacks. 34  The core legislation, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, focused on inter-agency and inter-governmental
coordination among federal, state, and local authorities. The Act
created a new umbrella federal agency, the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS"). DHS brought parts of more than 100 other agencies
under its authority, including the Federal Emergency Management
Agency ("FEMA") and Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS"), and its subdivision, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services ("CMS"). Other federal agencies central to disaster
management include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
33 See, e.g., Robert Block, Congress Begins FEMA Hearings, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2005, at A12 ("FEMA has become synonymous with the government's bungled
response to the hurricane, with a number of politicians saying part of the problem is
that the agency is no longer cabinet-level but rather a small cog in the mammoth
Department of Homeland Security"); see also The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina: Lessons Learned, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-
lessons-leamed.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) (Department of Homeland Security
study conducted under presidential directive, describing the failure of HHS to
maintain health and social services during the disaster and their need to better
coordinate these services with FEMA); see e.g., FARBER & CHEN, supra note 10, at
12 ("FEMA, the federal government's primary disaster-response agency, had no
effective supply-tracking system .... Planning and coordination were so poor that
truck drivers didn't know where to go, and emergency-management officials didn't
know what was en route or when it might show up") (citing United State Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs)).
34 See generally infra Section III (discussing Homeland Security Act of 2002 and
other post-9/11 federal legislation).
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("CDC"), Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), and the Department
of Defense ("DOD").
Turning now to state authority for disaster response, a range of
traditional reserved powers and state laws are implicated. States, in
their separate sovereign capacities may define rules and standards
differently, set different regulatory and budgetary priorities for public
safety, health care, public health, and welfare services. States may
allocate authority and assign duties differently from state to state,
creating challenges in identifying the relevant actors and coordinating
disaster response across state lines. Traditional state powers include
police, fire, and other health and public safety authorities. In fact,
"most public health activities take place at the state and local levels:
surveillance, communicable disease control, and food and water
safety.",35 Absent legislation creating FEMA, DHS, or other federal
authorities, emergency management of local disasters squarely sits
within states' traditional reserved powers.
In addition, states are responsible for regulating businesses and
professionals operating within their borders. States define
qualifications for and grant licenses to health care professionals.36
They may also inspect and approve health care facilities. Business
organizations, including medical practice partnerships and hospital
corporations, operate under state laws. States may enact legal
requirements particular to hospital organizations, including
requirements for bylaws, governance rules, and staff privileging
standards. In addition, medical professional standards of care and other
liability rules are defined by widely varying state tort laws.
Other state laws also bear on health care disaster response. For
example, workers' compensation systems that provide no-fault
alternatives for workplace injuries, including occupational diseases,
could compensate health care workers exposed to biological agents or
infectious disease. States also traditionally have broad authority to
regulate the business of insurance, including health insurance, subject
to sweeping federal preemption under the Employee Retirement
Insurance Security Act ("ERISA").37  Also, state welfare programs,
35 Gostin, supra note 18, at 87.
36 See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (recognizing state's authority
to provide for the general welfare of its people includes licensing medical
professionals who practice in the state).
37 Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 832, 29 U.S.C. §
1001 et seq.; see also McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (declaring that the
business of insurance should be "subject to the laws of the several States which relate
to the regulation or taxation of such business").
[VOL. 10.2:251
LESSONS FROM KATRINA
including Medicaid, the joint federal-state indigent health insurance
program, vary from state to state in terms of eligibility, coverage,
payment, and administration. An interstate or national disaster
management plan should consider how to coordinate the wide variety
of state business, tort, insurance, and other laws governing public
safety, emergency, medical, and welfare systems.
III. LEGAL RESPONSES TO DISASTERS
Disaster management during a major public health emergency calls for
unique legal responses. Authorities may require special powers to
effectively protect public health and safety. Those powers and
responsibilities implicate both the public health and federalism
concerns described above. 38 Public health intervention may necessarily
infringe on constitutionally protected rights and liberties. Accordingly,
states may need to enact special laws authorizing officials and
emergency responders to impose on individual rights in ways that
would be impermissible under normal circumstances but are necessary
given the exigency of the situation. At the same time, federal
intervention, including federal financing for disaster preparedness, may
be the best way to ensure adequate, coordinated response and safeguard
the nation's health and safety. Katrina was the first real-life test of the
post-9/11 laws authorizing special state emergency powers and
providing federal funding for public health emergencies. The
experience highlights what worked and what remains to be addressed in
both areas.
A. State Responses
After 9/11, public health advocates and disaster planners proposed
expanding states' emergency response powers. 39 With that goal in
mind, CDC representatives and other public health experts initiated
drafting of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
("MSEHPA") by a collaboration of scholars, governors, legislators,
public health commissions, and attorneys general, in consultation with
major stakeholders, including businesses, civil liberties organizations,
38 See supra Section II (describing conceptual underpinnings of disaster response).
39 See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Public Health Emergencies and
Legal Reform: Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice, 118 PUBLIC
HEALTH REPORTS 477 (Sept.-Oct. 2003) (explaining need for Model Act).
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and medical practitioners.4 ° MSEHPA would increase state and local
public health authority to protect individuals and manage property
during a state of emergency. As of October 24, 2006, forty-four states
and the District of Columbia had passed laws incorporating at least
some MSEHPA or similar provisions.4 1
MSEHPA is inherently controversial because of civil liberties
42implications. Public health interventions authorized by the Model
Act, including quarantine, surveillance, forced treatment, property
condemnation and destruction, and conscription of medical personnel
necessarily infringe on individual rights. The Supreme Court, however,
has repeatedly recognized the authority of states to intrude on
individual liberties, as long as there is a legitimate purpose and the
43infringement is no greater than necessary to achieve the purpose.
MSEHPA incorporates five basic public health powers:
preparedness, surveillance, property management, protection of
persons, and public information and communication. 44 The Model Act
grants the state's governor the power to declare a "Public Health
Emergency." "Public Health Emergency," for purposes of MSEHPA,
40 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law In An Age of Terrorism: Rethinking
Individual Rights and Common Goods, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 79, 83
(summarizing MSEHPA background and approach). The Center for Law & the
Public's Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Universities, of which Lawrence 0.
Gostin is the director, spearheaded the drafting effort. See generally
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/Modellaws.htm#MSEHPA (last visited
Sept. 22, 2006).
41 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, Legislative Surveillance Table
(maintained by The Center for Law & the Public's Health at Georgetown & Johns
Hopkins Universities, CDC Collaborating Center Promoting Health through Law),
available at http://www.publichleathlaw.net/Resources/Modellaws.htm (last visited
Sept. 22, 2006).
42 See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far
Are Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV.
1105, 1106 (2003) (noting that government's homeland security project is "politically
charged because it affords the state enhanced powers to restrict personal and
economic liberties"); see also Daniel M. Fox, Populations and the Law: The
Changing Scope of Health Policy, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 607, 611 (2003) (discussing
resistance to broad public health powers proposed in MSEHPA); Edward P. Richards
et al., Legislative Alternatives to the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(MSEHPA), LSU Program in Law, Science, and Public Health White Paper #2 (April
21, 2003), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/bt/MSEHPAreview.htm (last
visited Sept. 22, 2006) (identifying objections to Model Act).
43 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 179 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding state law on
mandatory vaccination); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (approving
involuntary civil commitment of mentally ill person).
44 See Gostin, supra note 40, at 83 (listing powers).
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is defined broadly as "an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or
health condition that ... is believed to be caused by bioterrorism or the
appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated infectious
agency or biological toxin" that poses a high probability of a large
number of deaths or serious disabilities in the population.45  The
governor of the state may terminate the declaration of Public Health
Emergency by executive order, and the declaration terminates
automatically after thirty days unless renewed. In addition, the state
legislature may terminate the declaration by a majority vote in both
houses.46
The public information and communication provisions of
MSEHPA are intended to assist public health authorities in detectingS47
and tracking public health emergencies. Health care providers,
coroners, and medical examiners are required to collect and report,
within twenty-four hours of an encounter, detailed patient information,
including name, date of birth, sex, race, occupation, home and work
addresses, and "any other information needed to locate the patient for
follow-up." 48 The "any other information" provision is dangerously
broad, but MSEHPA attempts to safeguard privacy and liberty rights,
providing that information sharing "shall be restricted to the
information necessary for the treatment, control, investigation, and
prevention of a public health emergency.
4 9
Although many state legislatures have embraced at least some
of MSEHPA's provisions, the Model Act has been widely criticized.
Various constituents, including physicians, public health authorities,
and civil libertarians, suggest that MSEHPA "treats American citizens
as if they were the enemy., 50  In particular, MSEHPA raises
41 MSEHPA § 104(m).
46 MSEHPA § 405(a) - (c).
47 See MSEHPA, art. III, §§ 301 (reporting), 302 (tracking), 303 (information
sharing).
48 See MSEHPA § 301(c) (regarding manner of reporting).
49 See MSEHPA § 303(c) (regarding information sharing on "reportable illnesses,
health conditions, unusual clusters, or suspicious events").
50 See, e.g., Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc., AAPS Analysis
Model Emergency Health Powers Act (MEHPA) Turns Governors into Dictators,
Dec. 3, 2001 at 1, available at http://www.aapsonline.org/testimony/emerpower.htm
(last visited Sept. 22, 2006) (quoting George Annas, Chairman, Health Law
Department, Boston University School of Public Health), reprinted at
http://www.mercola.com/2001/dec/26/mehpa.htm(last visited Sept. 22, 2006) (with
comments from Dr. Joseph Mercola, Author of the Total Health Program); see also
Naturodoc, Stop the Model Emergency Health Powers Act!, available at
http://www.naturodoc.com/library/News/MEHPA.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2006)
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constitutional questions about the scope of executive power and
possible infringement of civil liberties. 51  Opponents charge that
MSEHPA "in effect, empowers the Governor to create a police state by
fiat" and "[u]nder this Act, any governor could appoint himself dictator
by declaring a 'public health emergency' ' '52 Moreover, critics assert
that MSEHPA gives governors' broad powers to declare and terminate
an emergency, with only limited checks on that power from the state
legislature.
53
Other MSEHPA provisions, including those authorizing the
governor to take possession of or destroy private property, including
medical facilities and resources, are controversial and implicate both
property and liberty rights. From a professional autonomy perspective,
the state's authority to compel emergency responders,54 including
health care professionals, to assist in the event of an emergency, is
troubling. But the demand surge likely to result from a major
catastrophe may compel states to restrict professional autonomy in
favor of public welfare. Others charge that enforcement provisions are
unnecessarily harsh, authorizing law enforcement to threaten or use
deadly force to possess or destroy property and compel vaccination or
quarantine. The right to refuse medical treatment is rooted in state
(The Emergency Health Powers Act Turn Governors into Dictators urging readers to
sign petition against legislation, suggesting that "you will be charged with a crime"
unless individual submits to mandatory medical exam or vaccination, or physician
performs exam).
51 See Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health Emergencies:
Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 19 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 388 (2003) (discussing balance between "an
individual's legitimate expectation of privacy and the public health benefits to society
as a whole"). But see Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Powers Act:
Public Health & Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. &
MED. 3, 25 (2003) (disagreeing with criticism that MSEHPA creates threat to civil
liberties and could be triggered for epidemic, such as HIV/AIDS); James G. Hodge,
Jr., Bioterrorism Law and Policy: Critical Choices in Public Health, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 254, 259 (2002) (discussing restrictions on individual liberties and
bioterrorism); Ken Wing, Policy Choices & Model Acts: Preparing for the Next
Public Health Emergency, 13 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. & MED. 71, 75-77 (2003)
(discussing concerns regarding executive powers and suggesting that governor needs
broad powers to act in previously unimaginable scenarios).
52 See AAPS, supra note 50, at 2, 5.
53 See Gostin, HEALTH AFFAIRS, supra note 39, at 87 (identifying and rebutting those
concerns).
54 See ESAR-VHP Draft, supra note 24, at 24 (noting, for example, District of
Columbia's law requiring "health care providers within the District to reasonably
assist with the emergency response").
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common law and constitutional rights to bodily integrity. 55 Adding to
the potential for abuse, public health authorities exercising powers
under MSEHPA enjoy immunity from liability in state courts. 6
B. Federal Response
The events of fall 2001 highlighted the need for coordinated emergency
planning and preparedness for future terrorist attacks. Federal and state
public health authorities had committed some resources to bioterrorism
preparedness prior to 9/11, 57 but they made substantial additional
appropriations following the airline hijackings and subsequent
bioterrorism threats. In 2001, Congress passed the Public Health
Threats and Emergencies Act, which allocated $500 million to the
Department of Defense for grants and cooperative agreements with
states and local governments to address emergency and bioterrorism
58preparedness. In addition, the CDC's bioterrorism preparedness
funding jumped from negligible to $194 million in fiscal year 2001.
Following 9/11, Congress quickly passed several pieces of
legislation to better prepare the country to predict and respond to future
homeland terrorist attacks. In October 2001, President Bush signed the
"Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism" Act ("USA PATRIOT
Act"), which was primarily a national security law aimed at preventing
and prosecuting terrorism.59  The USA PATRIOT Act included the
First Responders Assistance Act, which designated ambulance
companies and hospitals as "first responders" eligible for grants to
55 See Reich, supra note 51, at 401-02, nn. 103-04 (citing cases).
56 See MSEHPA § 804(a) (providing immunity from liability for death, personal
injury, or property damage, for governor, public health authority, or any other state
official, expect in cases of "gross negligence or willful misconduct").
57 See James G. Hodge, Jr., Bioterrorism Law and Policy: Critical Choices in Public
Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 254, 254 (2002) (noting previous commitments).
58 Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 106-505, 114 Stat. 2314
(2000); see also National Conference of State Legislatures, AFI Health Committee,
Summary: Public Health Threats & Emergencies Act (revised Jan. 17, 2002),
available at http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/health/PHTEAS.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2006) (summarizing Pub. L. No. 106-505 appropriations and other provisions).
'9 See U.S.A. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107- 56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., 2 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.
(2001)).
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prepare to respond to acts of terrorism. 60 In January 2002, President
Bush signed a $2.9 billion bioterrorism appropriations bill, which
provided $1.1 billion to states to improve terrorism-related public
health emergency response preparedness.
6 1
The central piece of post-9/11 federal legislation was the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which brought more than 100
agencies, including some functions of HHS and FEMA, under the new
62cabinet-level DHS. The Act involved the largest restructuring of the
federal government since the creation of the Department of Defense
("DOD") in 1947.63 DHS oversees the nation's preparedness and
defense initiatives for future terrorist attacks, including biological and
chemical weapons attacks. Hospitals, public health agencies, and other
health care entities receive funding for response planning. 64  In
60See id. (codified at 28 U.S.C. 509.1005 (2001)); Edward F. McArdle, Survey of New
York Law: Health Law, 53 SYRACUSE L. REv. 629, 633 (2003) (describing USA
PATRIOT Act provisions applicable to health care providers).
61 See American Osteopathic Association, NOM Week - Bioterrorism Preparedness,
available at http://www.aoa-net.org/MediaCenter/nomweekbioterror.htm (last visited
Sept. 15, 2006) (summarizing federal responses to September 11, 2001 attacks and
subsequent bioterrorism threats); see also Tiana Mayere Lee, An EMTALA Primer:
The Impact of Changes in the Emergency Medicine Landscape on EMTALA
Compliance and Enforcement, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 145, 173-74 (2004) (discussing
post-9/11 funding priorities, including ensuring food safety and increasing hospital
capacity).
62 Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005 (enrolled as agreed to or passed by both
House and Senate), Pub.L. No. 107-296 (signed Nov. 25, 2002), codified at 6 U.S.C.
§ 101 et seq. (2002); see Wendy K. Mariner, Law & Public Health: Beyond
Emergency Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH L. 247, 263 (2005) (noting that "[a]fter
September 11, 2001, as part of the war on terror, the federal government has asserted
even greater influence in matters that affect public health - as a matter of national
security subject to federal jurisdiction").
63 See Kristi L. Koenig, et al., The Evolution of Protecting the U.S.: Transition from
Civil Defense, American College of Emergency Physicians, at 1 (June 8, 2005),
available at
http://www.acep.org/webportal/membercenter/sections/dis/newsletter/TheEvolutionof
ProtectingtheUSTransitionFromCivilDefense.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2006)
(describing legislation and impact); see also The White House, Securing the
Homeland, Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/progress/securiting.html (last visited Sept. 22,
2006).
64 See Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "emergency response
providers"); Homeland Security Presidential Directive, HSPD-8, § 2(d) (Dec. 17,
2003) [hereinafter Presidential Directive], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html (last visited
Sept. 22, 2006) (including hospitals within definition of "first responders" in
Homeland Security Act, making them eligible for first-responder funding).
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addition, the Act supported several drills and mass destruction
exercises in major cities to test the response readiness of public health
and other essential services.
65
The Homeland Security Act called for the creation of a fully
integrated national emergency response system, or National Response
Plan ("NRP"), adaptable to any domestic terrorist attack or natural
disaster. The NRP includes a National Incident Management System
("NIMS") to coordinate federal, state, and local entities' prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery plans. The President's
declaration of an "Incident of National Significance" invokes special
federal powers and coordinated assistance under NIMS. For example,
in the case of a declared emergency, local, private hospitals could draw
medical and other staff, facilities, and supplies from other hospitals,
including federal Veteran's Affairs facilities. In addition, the Secretary
could waive states' medical professional and facility licensing
requirements to allow providers to cross state lines and establish
makeshift hospitals and clinics. The NIMS envisions memoranda of
agreement ("MOUs") among federal agencies and between federal and
state authorities to allow advance planning of response efforts,
reciprocal duties, and cross-reimbursement among emergency medical
responders.
66
Other post-9/1 1 legislation aimed specifically at health care
preparedness. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 ("Bioterrorism Preparedness
Act" or "the Act") addresses various concerns, including national and
local emergency planning, coordination, and reporting; stockpiling of
medical supplies, including bioterrorist countermeasures or antidotes;
65 See Presidential Directive §§ 17 - 19 (regarding "Training and Exercises");
Thomas May, Political Authority in a Bioterror Emergency, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
159, 159-60 (2004) (describing May 2000, $3 million "TOPOFF" (referring to "Top
Officials") exercise, simulating bioterror attack of plague in Denver, Colorado);
Cynthia P. Schneider & Michael D. McDonald, "The King of Terrors" Revisited:
The Smallpox Vaccination Campaign and Its Lessons for Future Biopreparedness, 31
J.L. MED & ETHICS 580, 581 - 82 (2003) (describing 2001 "tabletop" bioterrorism
attack exercise and "Dark Winter" simulated smallpox attack exercise); see generally
Christian W. Erickson & Bethany A. Barratt, Prudence or Panic? Preparedness
Exercises, Counterterror Mobilization, and Media Coverage - Dark Winter,
TOPOFF 1 and 2, 1 J. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT (2004)
(describing preparedness exercises).
66 See generally Presidential Directive, supra note 64 (describing NRP); Department
of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRPFullText.pdf (last visited Sept. 22,
2006) (implementing NRP, based on Presidential Directive).
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enhanced controls over biological agents and toxins; and improved
access and availability of medical treatment. 67 The Act appropriated
$1.6 billion in federal grants to implement state plans and conduct local
preparedness activities, such as improving communications
infrastructure, training laboratory and other health care professionals to
screen for novel medical conditions, enhancing surveillance and
detection activities, and increasing stockpiles of medical equipment and
supplies.
68
The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act authorizes federal
authorities, in an emergency area, during an emergency period, to
waive or modify certain state and federal laws governing health care
providers to ensure adequate availability of medical services in the
event of a homeland security emergency. 69  An "emergency period"
must be declared by either the President, under the federal Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance authority, or the
Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), under Section 319
of the federal Public Health Service Act.7 ° Secretary Leavitt acted
under Section 319 to declare a Public Health Emergency ("PHE") in
the Gulf region states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 1135(a) (2005) (stating purpose as ensuring availability of
"sufficient health care items and services" during an emergency and exempting health
care providers from sanctions for "furnish[ing] such items and services in good faith,"
even if "unable to comply with one or more requirements described in subsection
(b)," which include conditions of participation and EMTALA sanctions for improper
transfer); see also Jason W. Sapsin, Introduction to Emergency Public Health Law for
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response, 9 WIDENER L. SyMp. J. 387, 298-99 (2003)
(summarizing provisions of Emergency Preparedness Act).
68 H.R. 3448, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 319 (2002); see also Lars Noah, Triage in the
Nation's Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54
S.C. L. REv. 741, 742 (2003) ('The tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the still
mysterious mailing of weaponized anthrax spores one month later, awakened this
country to the risks of bioterrorism and brought attention to what has become a
growing problem: shortages of antibiotics, vaccines, and other medical
technologies").
69 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(a)(1), (b) (2005) (authorizing Secretary "to temporarily
wave or modify" the application of certain laws "to ensure to the maximum extent
feasible ... that sufficient health care items or services are available to meet the needs
of individuals" in "any emergency area and during any emergency period," as so
defined in the Act).
'0 See Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 143(g)(1) (defining "emergency area" as geographical
area in which "emergency period," as defined in the Act, exists). The Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act amended section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, granting
broad authority to the Secretary of HHS to declare a "public health emergency"
("PHE") at the federal level.
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Texas after Hurricane Katrina. 71 Specifically, authorities may waive or
modify Medicare and Medicaid conditions of participation, state
licensure requirements, and provider payment limitations and
prerequisites under federal health programs.
The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act also allows federal
authorities to waive sanctions for violations of the federal Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"). 73 EMTALA
requires Medicare-participating hospitals to provide appropriate, non-
discriminatory medical screenings to all individuals with emergency
medical conditions, without regard to a patient's ability to pay or
Medicare eligibility.74  Specifically, hospitals must screen "any
individual regardless of diagnosis (e.g., labor, AIDS), financial status
(e.g., uninsured, Medicaid), race, color, national origin (e.g., Hispanic
or Native American surnames), handicap, etc. 75  EMTALA was
"' See Secretary of HHS, Determination That a Public Health Emergency Exists (Aug.
31, 2005), available at http://www.hhs.gov/emergency/determination.html (last
visited Sept. 22, 2006) (declaring PHE under section 319 in Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, and Mississippi as a consequence of Hurricane Katrina); Secretary of
HHS, Determination That a Public Health Emergency Exists (Sept. 4, 2005),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/emergency/determinationl.html (last visited Sept.
22, 2006) (declaring same in Texas).
72 42 U.S.C. § 1135(b)(1)(A), (3) (2005) (authorizing U.S. Secretary of Health and
Hum. Services to waive or modify certain requirements); see Project Bioshield § 9
(amending language of § 1135(b)(1)(A), regarding EMTALA and sanctions for
improper transfers and adding § 1135(b)(7), regarding waiver of certain privacy
provisions of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996); see also
42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)(2) (2005) (providing that sanctions "for inappropriate transfer
during a national emergency do not apply to a hospital with a dedicated emergency
department located in an emergency area").
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(b)(1) - (3) (2005) (providing sanctions for improper
transfer).
74 Final Rule, Medicare Program; Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities
of Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals with Emergency Medical
Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. 53222, 53222 (Sept. 9, 2003) (summarizing EMTALA
requirements); Sara Rosenbaum & Brian Kamoie, Finding a Way Through the
Hospital Door: The Role of EMTALA in Public Health Emergencies, 31 J.L. MED. &
ETHIcs 590, 590 (2003) (noting that "EMTALA imposes on all Medicare-
participating hospitals a singular, legally enforceable duty of care, entitling all
individuals who seek care at hospital emergency departments to an appropriate (i.e.,
nondiscriminatory) examination and to either stabilizing treatment or a medically
appropriate transfer if an emergency medical condition is identified"); see 42 USC §
1395dd(b)(1) (codified EMTALA provisions).
75 Health Care Financing Admin. ("HCFA"), Department of Health & Human
Services ("HHS") Interpretive Guidelines - Responsibilities of Medicare Participating
Hospitals in Emergency Cases app. v at v-19 (May 1998); see Lee supra note 61, at
151 (quoting same).
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enacted in response to widespread "patient dumping" or the practice of
denying treatment to patients needing emergency services, especially
indigent and uninsured patients.76 Without the PHE waiver, EMTALA
could severely hamper disaster response by exposing hospitals to
sanctions for refusing to treat patients at damaged or over-burdened
facilities. Hospitals might also anticipate sanctions for immediately
diverting patients for quarantine at designated infectious-disease
centers before providing otherwise required EMTALA screening or
stabilization.
The temporary waivers are designed remove some obstacles to
providing emergency medical services and thereby increase the supply
of health care providers in the event of an emergency. For example, a
hospital or physician who opted out of becoming a Medicare-
participating provider to avoid rigorous and costly compliance
obligations may be willing to sign up for the limited purpose of
providing emergency care in the event of a homeland security attack or
other public health emergency. The state licensing waivers allow
hospitals in an affected state to address the demand surge for medical
care by recruiting temporary help from out-of-state, otherwise
unlicensed medical professionals. In addition, locations such as hotels
or sports arenas could be used as temporary hospitals or clinics without
meeting state facility licensing requirements. The EMTALA waiver
does not relieve hospitals' duty to provide emergency medical care
without regard to payment but does allow coordinated community
response plans, for example, by designating certain hospitals as trauma,
infectious-disease, or other specialized facilities to which patients could
be diverted.
Project Bioshield was a response the anthrax and SARS threats
that occurred after the 9/11 attacks.77 Project Bioshield aims to
76 H.R. Rep. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 5 (1986); see id. at 27 (discussing
Committee's concerns regarding "increasing number of reports" of hospitals refusing
to provide treatment or transferring patients in unstable conditions); see also Maria
O'Brien Hylton, The Economics and Politics of Emergency Health Care for the Poor:
The Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 971, 1013 (1992) (suggesting
that increasing number of dumping cases involve patients with insurance, but
inadequate coverage, including patients discharged when insurance runs out and
AIDS patients); Bleys W. Rose, Emergency Rooms Get Federal Relief, Relaxation of
1986 Rules Intended to Help Hospitals Deal with Financial Burden of Uninsured
May Cut Losses, THE PRESS DEMOCRAT, Nov. 3, 2003, at D1 (noting that Congress
enacted EMTALA "in response to complaints from public hospitals that for-profit
facilities were 'dumping' uninsured patients on their emergency rooms").
77 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing Toronto SARS episode).
[VOL. 10.2:251
LESSONS FROM KATRINA
improve pharmacological interventions to protect the public against
78chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks. Project
Bioshield Act of 2004 ("Bioshield I") authorized $5.6 billion over ten
years and streamlined the procurement process for government
purchasing and stockpiling of vaccines and drugs to treat anthrax,
smallpox, botulism, and other biological agents as well as radiation and
79chemical weapons exposures.
Bioshield I provided grants for biodefense medical research,
including $1.5 billion per year since 2003 for National Institutes of
Health studies on treatments for smallpox, anthrax, Ebola, and other
80pathogens. In addition, the law provides incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to conduct research and development for
new vaccines and treatments, including expedited FDA approval and
guaranteed federal market for the new products. The law also allows
distribution of best available treatments, including drugs and devices
not yet FDA-approved, in some cases. 81  Project Bioshield also
supports surveillance, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts. Under
the Bioshield I, federal authorities deployed new environmental
detectors and expanded existing disease surveillance techniques. The
intelligence community was authorized to use new scientific methods
for foreign weapons study, and law enforcement authorities may
employ novel scientific forensics for investigating biological crimes.
82
In April 2005, Senator Lieberman proposed Project Bioshield
Act of 2005 ("Bioshield II"),83 which would include additional
financial incentives for developing countermeasures. The act also
78 Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276 (2004) [hereinafter Project
Bioshield I]; White House Press Release, President Bush Signs Project Bioshield Act
of 2004, (July 21, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040721-2.html (last visited
Sept. 22, 2006).
79 See Project Bioshield I, supra note 75, §§ 319F-1, 3, 319F-2, 510 (outlining
policies and strategies);
80 See U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Srvs., Fact Sheet, HHS Fact Sheet - Project
Bioshield (July 21, 2004), available at
http://www/hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040721b.html (last visited Sept. 22,
2006).
81 See Project Bioshield I, supra note 78, § 564 (amending Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2004) and authorizing use of medical products
in emergencies).
82 See HHS Fact Sheet - Project Bioshield, supra note 80 (summarizing key
provisions on day President Bush signed legislation into law).
83 Project Bioshield II Act of 2005, s. 975, 109th Cong. (introduced by Senators
Lieberman and Hatch on April 29, 2005).
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would provide immunity from liability for pharmaceutical companies
and health care providers using fast-track or provisionally approved
products. An alternative government compensation fund would be
established for persons injured by the vaccines and other drugs. No
action has been taken on the bill since it went to subcommittee on July
21, 2005.
C. Katrina Response
Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans levee collapse tragically and
84
starkly demonstrated the nation's lack of disaster preparation. As one
commentator noted, "After the levees broke, we watched every single
system associated with the life of a city fail: the electrical grid, the
water system, the sewer system, the transportation system, the police
force, the fire department, the hospitals, even the system of disposing
of corpses." 85 Health care providers, in particular, faced a range of
issues responding to and recovering from Katrina.86 The catastrophe
provides still-emerging lessons for health care response and the
resulting financial strain on health care providers in the disaster region
and beyond.87
Specifically for the medical system, the disaster illuminated
fundamental weaknesses in the current, gap-ridden approach to health
care financing in the United States. Even before Katrina, fifty-one
84 See Choo, supra note 17, at 39 ("Anyone looking for lessons about the value of
preparedness does not need to look far. A good place to start is the U.S. Gulf Coast,
still reeling from the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina when it hit on Aug.
29").
85 Nicholas Lemann, In the Ruins, NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 2005).
86 See id. (discussing combined impact of region's pre-Katrina health and poverty
problems, physical damage to health care facilities, staffing shortages, lost medical
data, disaster-related health and mental health care needs, and other factors on health
care infrastructure); Two New Orleans Hospitals Beyond Help; Head of Hospitals:
$440 Million Needed to Replace Facilities, CNN.coM, Oct. 5, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/10/05/neworleans.hospitals/ (last visited Sept. 24,
2006) 2005 (reporting that two main public hospitals, Charity and University, serving
New Orleans were damaged beyond repair and will close); see also Kaiser Report
7387, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing effects of "Big Charity" hospital closing, which
"served as the primary safety net hospital for thousands of New Orleans residents";
"51 percent of its patients were uninsured and another 32 percent were covered by
Medicaid").
87 See, e.g., Kaiser Family Foundation, Voices of the Storm: Health Experiences of
Low-Income Katrina Survivors; Health Care in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
KFF Publication No. 7538 (Aug. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/080806pkg.cfm (last visited Sept. 24, 2006).
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percent of the Gulf region population lacked health insurance.
Medicaid, the joint federal-state health insurance program for the
indigent, covered thirty-two percent of the Gulf region's residents.
88
Katrina exacerbated the problem of the uninsured and exposed the
drawbacks of health insurance that lacks portability.89 After the storm
and flooding, the number of uninsured rose dramatically. Most
Americans receive health insurance from their employer-based group
plans. But as businesses were washed out of the region, so too were
their employees' jobs, salaries, and benefits, including health
insurance. 90  In addition, people covered by government health care
programs, such as Medicaid, lost coverage because Medicaid eligibility
is tied to state residence. Therefore, Louisiana residents who evacuated
to. other states lost coverage unless they reapplied in the state to which
they were displaced. 91 Some newly uninsured Katrina victims may
retain sufficient assets that will prevent them from meeting Medicaid
88 See Kalb & Murr, supra note 1 (citing statistics); see also Sara Rosenbaum, U.S.
Health Policy in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, JAMA, Jan. 25, 2006, at 437
(citing similar figures).
89 See Rosenbaum, supra note 88, at 437, 438 (noting that "[f]or decades the Gulf
Region population has lived daily with the consequences of the nation's gap-ridden
approach to health care financing" and "[d]espite Medicaid's strengths, it lacks
Medicare's nationwide, uniform coverage potential and interstate portability");
Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, A Long Road to Recovery; Shut Out on Healthcare After
the Storm, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at Al (discussing paradox of workers losing
employer health insurance yet not qualifying for government health care programs,
such as Medicaid); Dana P. Goldman & Mark A. Schuster, Commentary: Health
Costs of Katrina, RAND CORPORATION, Oct. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.rand.org/commentary/101005UPI.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2006)
(appearing in United Press International) (noting that victims "deprived of paychecks
and employer-sponsored health insurance" are "[s]uddenly unable to pay their
medical bills" and "now face a health care crisis"); Kaiser Report 7387, supra note 1,
at 1 (suggesting that "Katrina has raised both the number of people in poverty and the
number of uninsured living in the States hit by Katrina as well as in the States of
refuge").
90 See Kaiser Report 7387, supra note 1, at 1 ("An estimated 400,000 jobs have been
lost; many of those who lost their jobs and lost not only their source of income but
also the health insurance coverage that their former employees offered"); Miller,
Katrina Claims Pass '04 Storms, supra note 7, at A10 (quoting State Farm employee,
"I've had people call and say they're not only homeless, but they're also jobless
because the place they worked is just gone").
91 See Rudowitz, supra note 3, at 4 (reporting that Louisiana sent notices to 20,000
Medicaid enrollees in March 2006, informing them that their Louisiana Medicaid
would end June 30, 2006 and that those people may become uninsured unless they are
eligible for and able to enroll in their new states' Medicaid programs).
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income-eligibility limits in whichever state they currently live.92 Other
flood victims may be sufficiently destitute to qualify but not meet
residency requirements in the states to which they have temporary
migrated. Medicare beneficiaries may have lost identification cards or
medical records crucial to obtaining medical care.
The Gulf region suffered from a poor overall level of health and
welfare, even before the storm. Nearly half of Orleans Parish and one-
third of Jefferson Parish were low-income. 93 Forty-one percent of the
population suffered from chronic conditions, such as heart disease,
hypertension, asthma, diabetes, and cancer. Storm-damaged facilities
and evacuation of health care providers exacerbated existing access to
care challenges. 94  Disabled and chronic-disease patients requiring
regular treatment to manage their diseases could not access medical and
social services and, in some cases, could not be located. Loss of crucial
personal documents, medical records, and pharmaceuticals added to the
challenges.95 Mental health needs rose for storm victims facing loss of
homes, lives, property, employment, and other upheaval. 96 The New
Orleans health care infrastructure was severely crippled by the storm.
The two largest public hospitals, Louisiana State University Hospital
and "Big" Charity, were damaged beyond repair and closed for months
following the flood.9 7
The government response to the health care crisis in the flooded
Gulf Coast was rapid and fairly comprehensive. Immediate emergency
funding and temporary waivers were enacted to address the region's
health care needs during and immediately after the catastrophe. In
addition, federal authorities debated and eventually enacted long-term
92 See Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 89, at Al ("Under present rules for Katrina
victims, if you are destitute, the government will pay your medical bills .... But if
you're an adult who had a job that included health benefits and you lost the job
because of the storm, the government can't seem to help").
93 See Rudowitz, supra note 3, at 1 (defining low-income as family income below
200% federal poverty level).
94 Kaiser Report 7387, supra note 1, at 2 ("The capacity of primary care providers to
serve low-income populations remaining in directly affected areas has been reduced
or eliminated").
95 See FARBER & CHEN, supra note 10, at 5.
96 See Kalb & Murr, supra note 1 (discussing existing area's existing health care
problems - "nickname: 'the stroke belt"' - and additional chronic disease, mental
health, and public health needs of Gulf Coast residents); see also Nobody Left
Behind: Disaster Preparedness for Persons with Mobility Impairments, available at
http://www.nobodyleftbehind2.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) (assessing the impact
of Hurricane Katrina).
97 See Rudowitz et al., supra note 3.
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financial and other support for patients and providers. Nevertheless,
the impact on the region's economy, generally, and health care
infrastructure, specifically, will likely be severe and lasting.98 Health
care providers as far away as Houston, Atlanta, and beyond are
struggling to return to normal operations and remain solvent now that
the flood waters have receded. 99
After the levees broke, the federal government quickly
appropriated $62.3 billion in emergency assistance, most of which went
to FEMA. 00 Many observers expressed concern that FEMA money
was put to questionable use. 10 1 Both Democrats and Republicans called
for investigation into spending of hurricane relief funds.' 02 Subsequent
relief packages were scaled back under budget and other pressures.'
0 3
As far as health care providers are concerned, FEMA offers little
assistance. The federal disaster relief program pays only for the cost of
rebuilding disaster-damaged hospitals and expressly excludes direct-
care and administrative costs of treating disaster victims.' 
04
98 See generally Kalb & Murr, supra, note 1 (discussing various factors affecting
region's health care system); NPR Transcript, supra note 1 (same).
99 See Kaiser Report 7387, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that "[h]ospitals located in
communities receiving large inflows of individuals displaced by Katrina are facing
increased demand"; Houston's Harris County hospital district, in particular, has
assumed care of 23,000 evacuees living in the Astrodome, and Baton Rouge's
population has doubled); Andy Miller, Evacuees' Access to Medicaid Eased, Cox
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 7, 2005 (noting top Georgia public health official's "warniing]
that treating Katrina's victims on top of metro Atlanta's perennially packed
emergency rooms may finally break the system").
100 See Congress Responds to Hurricane Katrina, US FED NEWS, Sept. 12, 2005
(reporting initial Katrina relief appropriations); Impact of Hurricane on 2007 Budget:
Hearing before the House Budget Committee, 108th Cong. (2005) (statement of
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office).
'0' See Angie C. Marek and Edward T. Pound, A Flood of Money, 139 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT 13, Oct. 10, 2005, at 24 (describing a $236 million 6-month contract
with Carnival cruise lines for the use of three ships to shelter and feed evacuees and
emergency workers which were currently at half-capacity, and a now-halted $2 billion
contract to buy 120,000 trailers as emergency housing where 109 Louisiana families
have been relocated).
102 See id. (reporting that one month after the hurricanes struck, DHS established an
Office of Hurricane Katrina Oversight and appointed Matthew Jadacki, formerly a
senior official at FEMA, as head of the auditing office).
103 See David Rogers, White House to Trim Katrina Spending Request, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 19, 2005, at A8 (reporting White House plans scale back "Katrina spending
requests to keep next relief package in the $20 billion range and offset the costs with
equivalent savings").
'04 See Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 402(a), codified as 42
U.S.C. § 5121 (authorizing President to make contributions to State or local
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Consistent with the post-9/11 preparedness legislation, post-
Katrina, the Bush Administration's focus was ensuring that providers
could meet the immediate health care needs of the flood victims. But
federal authorities support stopped short of providing lasting financial
stabilization to the fragile health care infrastructure. 105 Secretary
Leavitt's declaration of public health emergencies in Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas authorized those states to waive
certain Medicare, Medicaid, State Child Health Insurance Program
governments "to help repair, restore, reconstruct, or replace public facilities belonging
to such State of local governments which were damaged or destroyed by a major
disaster"); Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as
amended by Pub. L. No. 106-390, October 30, 2000, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 102 ch.
68 (2000) (authorizing funding for rebuilding costs). But see FEMA, Public
Assistance, Response and Recovery Policy No. 9525.4, sect. 7(B)(2) (Aug. 17, 1999),
available at http://www.fema.gov/rrr/pa/9525_4.shtm (last visited Sept. 24, 2006)
(defining facilities' "ineligible costs" as "Cost of emergency medical treatment of any
kind"; "Cost of follow-on treatment of disaster victims"; "Increased administrative
and operational cost to the hospital due to increased patient load"; and "Costs
associated with loss of revenue"). University and Big Charity, for example, likely will
qualify for FEMA rebuilding grants. In addition, FEMA may provide individual
patients up to $26,500 per patient funds to cover health care costs. But health care
providers are required to bill patients or their insurers for treatment-related costs. In
the wake of Katrina, FEMA funds were sought for other previously unauthorized
disaster-response costs, including paying base salaries of disaster-area local
government employees. See Louisiana Faces Cash Crisis; White House Says It Will
Ask Congress to Ease Funding Rule, CNN.cOM, Oct. 5, 2005, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/10/05/katrina.responders/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2006)
(citing Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco that Louisiana has $1 billion deficit and
is running out of money to pay police officers, firefighters, and other emergency
workers). Over objections of civil-liberties organizations, FEMA also pledged to
reimburse churches and other faith-based organizations that provided emergency
housing, food, supplies, and other support to flood victims. Allen Cooperman &
Elizabeth Williamson, FEMA Plans to Reimburse Faith Groups for Aid; As Civil
Libertarians Object, Faith Groups Weigh Whether to Apply, WASH. POST, Sept. 27,
2005, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/26/AR2005092601799.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006)
(noting First Amendment objections and charities' concerns that private donors would
be deterred if the organizations were receiving federal funds).
105 See Elliot Blair Smith, Hospitals in New Orleans See Surge In Uninsured Patients
But Not Public Funds, USA TODAY, April 26, 2006 (quoting Ochsner Medical Center
CEO: 'The kind of losses the major institutions are incurring . . . [are] simply not
sustainable."), available at http://www.usatoday.cor/money/industries/health/2006-
04-25-new-orleans-hospitals-usat-x.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
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("SCHIP"), and patient privacy requirements, 106 just as contemplated
by the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act. 1
07
In addition, HHS promised full payment and exemption from
sanctions for Medicare and Medicaid providers furnishing medical
services in good faith but unable to fully comply with program
requirements due to the disaster.'0 8 EMTALA sanctions were waived
for transferring a patient for medical assessment from a public health
emergency location to a facility in a less hazardous locale.'0 9 Also,
certain patient privacy requirements under the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA")" "0 were lifted to
allow health care providers to speak with family members, even if the
patient was unable to give consent. Standard pre-authorization
requirements for Medicaid, Medicare, and SCHIP were waived to
enable emergency treatment of new enrollees."' Government health
care program claims processors were instructed to respond immediately
to disaster-affected providers' requests for accelerated or interim
payments. 
1 1 2
The Secretary's declaration allowed states to relax laws related
to professional and facility licensing, credentialing, and certification in
the disaster region to address the demand surge. Physicians and other
licensed medical providers were authorized to treat patients in
Louisiana and other affected states without fearing regulatory sanctions
or liability for unlicensed practice of medicine or other professions, as
contemplated by the Emergency System for Advance Registration of
106 HHS Declares Public Health Emergency for Hurricane Katrina, United States
Department of Health and Human Services, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/katrina/emergency.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
107 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text
108 Thomas Dowdell, Hurricane Katrina; HHS Policy, Fulbright & Jaworski, Sept. 7,
2005, available at
http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail&pubid=2010&s
iteid=494&detail=yes (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
109 Id.
110 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), Pub. L.
No. 104-191; 45 C.F.R. parts 160 and 164; Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82462 (Dec. 28, 2000).
111 Dowdell, supra note 108.
112 Id. In addition, state licensing requirements were waived to allow physicians,
nurses, and other health-care professionals licensed in other states to provide
emergency services in the disaster area and some patient privacy rules under the
federal Health Improvement Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") were
lifted to allow providers to talk with family members about a patients' condition even
if the patient could not consent and to help patients without access to identification or
records. Id.
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Volunteer Health Professionals ("ESAR-VHP")." 3 In addition, non-
licensed, makeshift facilities, such as department stores, hotels, and
tents, could be used as hospitals. 14 The Secretary also declared that
crisis services provided to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries in non-
certified facilities would be fully reimbursed.
To address Katrina's uninsured problem, Congress considered a
disaster relief Medicaid proposal, modeled on New York State's
expansion of state Medicaid coverage following 9/11.115 The New
York program, which covered 350,000 people in the four months
following the attack, offered simplified applications, on-the-spot
eligibility determinations, and immediate enrollment. The proposed
Emergency Health Care Relief Bill Act of 2005, sponsored by Senators
Grassley and Baucus, would have provided immediate, five-month
Medicaid coverage for all flood victims." 6  Income, residency, and
other eligibility requirements would be waived. Like the New York
program, application requirements would be streamlined and
simplified. 117 In addition, the federal government would pick up the
entire tab for the special Medicaid coverage, unlike the existing
113 See supra note 24 (citing same).
114 See Rudowitz et al., supra note 3, at 4 (describing temporary locations of New
Orleans' public hospitals, including an abandoned department store and a suburban
hospital).
115 See LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES
FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS 94 - 95 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 2004) (describing
Disaster Relief Medicaid ("DRM") and noting that New York City's Medicaid
computer system and eligibility records were damaged on 9/11, requiring authorities
to develop new eligibility cutoffs, which were higher than traditional Medicaid); Sara
Rosenbaum, New Directions for Health Insurance Design: Implications for Public
Health Policy and Practice, 31 J.L. MED & ETHICS 94, 99 (2003) [hereinafter New
Directions] (describing post-9/11 emergency health care funding).
116 Emergency Health Care Relief Bill Act of 2005 (S. 1716) (sponsored by Senators
Grassley and Baucus); Grassley-Baucus Emergency Health Care Relief Package
Summary, available at http://
http://fmance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/prgO9l405asumm.pdf (last visited Sept.
25, 2006); see Todd Zwillich, Sens. Back Full Katrina Medical Payments, UPI, Sept.
12, 2005 (describing proposal).
17 See Zwillich, supra note 116 (quoting co-sponsor Grassley: "You're entitled to
Medicaid regardless of your income. . . . Don't worry about your healthcare");
Katrina Care; Speedy Coverage for Evacuees, MINN. STAR TRmUNE, Oct. 8, 2005, at
18A [hereinafter Katrina Care]; MH Coalition Supports Health Care Bill for Katrina
Survivors, 37 MENTAL HEALTH WEEKLY 15, Sept. 26, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter MH
Support].
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Medicaid program, which is jointly funded by states and the federal
government.
The Bush administration, however, opted for a different
approach, allowing flood-affected states to apply for individual waivers
to state Medicaid plans. The White House opted to negotiate "directly
with governors, one state at a time," believing it more efficient to
support the state programs already in place, not to build major new
systems." 19 Critics suggested that requiring individual negotiations was
inefficient and would delay coverage to needy beneficiaries. 120  The
Medicaid waiver programs allow displaced and newly uninsured
victims of the flood to obtain Medicaid in the states to which they
evacuated under streamlined application processes.1
2
'
Temporary Medicaid was designed to address both the
uninsured patient and provider payment problems. The approach,
however, leaves significant potential gaps. For providers,
compensation is tied to the patient, as opposed to a grant or lump-sum
118 Katrina Care, supra note 117, at 18A (noting full federal reimbursement to states);
MH Support, supra note 117, at 1 (quoting co-sponsor Senator Grassley: "The
federal government will assist Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama by paying 100
percent of Medicaid and child health care program costs through 2006").
l9 See David S. Broder, Waitingfor Action; Right Words but Little Practical Help for
Poor, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2005, at A25 (quoting CMS' Mark McClellan: "The
best and fastest was to provide help to evacuees is to support the state programs in
place and support the local health care providers already in place, not to take time to
build new systems"). But see Katrina Care; Speedy Coverage for Evacuees, MINN.
STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 8, 2005, at 18A [hereinafter Speedy Coverage] (arguing merits of
Grassley-Baucus proposal and noting that "negotiating waivers state by state is
crazy," time-consuming, "risks wild variation," and imposing unsustainable costs on
Gulf Coast states).
120 See Broder, supra note 119, at A25 (suggesting that "the Bush Administration,
rather than backing this simple and effective measure [i.e., extending Medicaid
coverage to all victims], is insisting on a slower, more cumbersome approach,
requiring each state to negotiate its own waiver from the rules limiting eligibility to
Medicaid beneficiaries"); Speedy Coverage, supra note 119, at 18A (summarizing
Grassley-Baucas bill as "call[ing] for a fast, streamlined application process").
121 See Estimates Show More than 40 Percent of Hurricane Evacuees Now Receiving
HHS Benefits or Services, PRNEWSWIRE, Sept. 29, 2005 (listing states receiving
waivers) [hereinafter PRNEWSWIRE]; Kaiser Report 7420, supra note 4, at 1 - 2
(describing 10 approved state waivers and details of enrollment and coverage); CMS
Take Emergency Steps to Ease Health Care Access to Katrina Evacuees, CMS Fact
Sheet, Sept., 9, 2005, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/pf/printpage.asp?ref+http://63.241.27.78/media/press/release
.asp?counter=1551 (last visited Sept. 25, 2006) (discussing availability of emergency
section 1115 demonstrations to provide temporary eligibility to Medicaid and SCHIP
and new application template).
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payment directly to hospitals or other health care providers facing the
demand surge.122 Benefits are not portable, meaning that patients must
re-apply and qualify if they leave or are evacuated to a different state.
Coordination of financing between home and host states for patients
who move was not addressed in the plan. The waivers are temporary
and not intended to become a permanent, new federal entitlement.
23
Eight states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico received
Medicaid waivers. In addition, six states' waivers included
uncompensated care pools, in addition to temporary Medicaid,,
24
intended to reimburse states for the cost of medical care provided to
uninsured evacuees. The funds were given to states in block grants,
with no obligation to pay specific providers. In addition, few details
were developed regarding funding levels or sources for the pools or
methodologies for prioritizing or paying providers.
125
Like government payers, private health insurers took steps to
ensure uninterrupted medical and dental coverage for their enrollees
and payment to providers. Private health plans extended due-dates or
granted grace-periods for premium payments and waived certain
medical and pharmacy restrictions.' 26  Many plans suspended prior
authorization, pre-certification, referral, or notification requirements for
hospital admission. Some companies deemed all physicians caring for
affected members as in-network providers regardless of their actual
122 See Kaiser Report 7387, supra note 1, at 7 (advocating temporary Medicaid as
solution to loss of health insurance coverage by Katrina victims because funds
"follow the person" and approach is "the most accurate mechanism for targeting
federal assistance to the areas, providers, and low-income individuals who most need
it").
123 See Speedy Coverage, supra note 119, at 18A (noting temporary nature of both
Bush and Grassley-Baucus plans and suggesting, "Anyone can understand the
administration's reluctance to create a big new federal entitlement, especially in the
costly field of health care").
124 Kaiser Report 7420, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that the pools are available for
expenses incurred from Aug. 24, 2005, to Jan. 31, 2006).
125 See Health Care for Katrina Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A26 (reporting
that "White House has said it will reimburse health care providers who treat victims
who are not covered by Medicaid. But it has not wais how much the payments would
be or how providers could access the so-called uncompensated care fund"); Kaiser
Report 7420, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that that "critical components," including
funding and payment mechanisms for uncompensated care pools are not specified).
126 Gloria Gonzalez, Health Insurers Waive Rules for Katrina Victims, 39 Bus.
INSURANCE 37, Sept. 12, 2005 (listing CIGNA, Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Aetna,
Delta Dental Insurance, and Humana Inc. as companies extending their coverage
despite a lapse in payment).
[VOL. 10.2:251
LESSONS FROM KATRINA
status. 127  Other plans allowed patients to obtain early refills of
prescription medications and facilitated mail-order refills to replace
damaged or lost medications. 128
IV. REMAINING ISSUES
The legislative and policy measures implemented after Katrina provide
a starting point for emergency response planning. Myriad issues
remain, however, and full consideration of the public health and
federalism challenges is beyond the scope of this Article. Two of the
most pressing needs-ensuring adequate medical response and
payment to providers-deserve special attention. The health care
infrastructure may fail to meet the immediate and long-term needs of
disaster victims if those issues are not addressed prospectively, before
the next catastrophe.
The Katrina response failed, first, to adequately address the
largest remaining disaster response issue for the nation's emergency
medical providers: Demand surge. 129  The next major catastrophe-
whether a terrorist attack, such as 9/11; natural disaster, such as
Katrina; or infectious disease outbreak, such as Avian Flu-will likely
cause acute injuries and exacerbate underlying chronic health
conditions of a large number of people. As one reporter presciently
noted in the days before Katrina, in reference to a potential Avian Flu
outbreak: "[T]he most significant problem in 1918 [at the height the
nation's major smallpox epidemic], as it would be today, was the sheer
inability of hospitals to deal with a sudden demand in patient
demand." 
30
Demand surge implicates public health models, calling for
medical first responders' scarce professional and other resources to be
allocated among the disaster victims. Emergency medicine triage
models allow first responders to prioritize the victims and ensure that
127 id.
128 id.
129 See Institute of Medicine, The Future Emergency Care in the United States, June
14, 2006, at http://www.iom.edu/?ID=16107 (last visited Dec. 12, 2006) (reporting
results of there related studies; Ambulances Find Overwhelmed ERs "At Breaking
Point," WALL ST. J., June 15, 2006, at D6 (describing IOM study, nothing that
"nationwide crisis comes from just day-to-day emergencies. Emergency rooms are
far from ready to handle the mass casualties that a bird-flu epidemic or terrorist strike
would bring").
130 Marc Santora, When a Bug Becomes a Monster, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005
(describing New York City's readiness to respond to avian influenza outbreak).
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the most serious cases are treated before those whose health will not
deteriorate dramatically if treatment is delayed. The goal of providing
optimal care to the affected population as a whole may require
compromising best practices or optimal medical care of any given
patient. That approach might be ethically intolerable or legally suspect
under "normal" circumstances but necessary and appropriate in disaster
scenarios.
To avoid or limit some of the tragic resource allocation
choices,13 1 disaster preparedness should focus on improving health care
providers' response capacity and patients' access to care. Post-9/l1
federal legislation provides funding for hospitals and clinics to
stockpile drugs and other medical supplies. Federal preparedness
grants are also available for training and preparedness measures. The
Homeland Security Act made considerable strides in coordinating
disparate branches of levels of government. But the severe criticism of
FEMA, DHS, and other federal agencies during Katrina suggest the
need for further consideration of the NRP and other organizational
functions. 132 In particular, additional issues need to be addressed to
ensure adequate, coordinated response and uninterrupted access to care
both during the immediate catastrophe and after in order to return the
health care infrastructure to normal operations after the crisis has
passed.
131 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17 - 18
(1978) (discussing "how the world decides that suffering shall come to some persons
and not to others" when faced with scarce goods, the distribution of which "entails
freat suffering or death").
See, e.g., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office ("GAO"), Testimony before the
Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Federal
Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and Issues to Consider
for Organizational Placement, Statement of William 0. Jenkins, Jr., Director of
Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Report No. GAO-06-746T (May 9, 2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06746t.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2006)
(describing FEMA's performance during hurricane Katrina and raising questions
regarding agency's organizational placement); U.S. GAO, Statement by Comptroller
General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Report No. GAO-06-
365R (Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06365r.pdf (last
visited Sept. 25, 2006) (suggesting need for clear, decisive leadership, in single
individual accountable to the President; Block, supra note 32, at A12 (reporting on
start of congressional hearings on Katrina response); Pam Fessler, Fragmented
Government Slowed Katrina Response, National Public Radio, Aug. 10, 2006,
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5183478 (last
visited Sept. 25, 2006) (reporting on GAO report).
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Waivers of facility and professional licensing requirements, as
proposed in MSEHPA and included in Secretary Leavitt's Katrina
Section 319 PHE declaration, somewhat alleviate staffing and facility
shortages. Waiving state licensing requirements, however, addresses
the problem only after medical professionals have arrived and been
deployed to provide care at the scene of the disaster. Waivers do not
ensure adequate volunteer response or verification of the identity,
qualifications, and competence of the volunteers. Spontaneous
volunteers, like those who appeared on the scene of the Oklahoma City
bombing, World Trade Center attacks, or other recent disasters, were
ready and willing to lend assistance but lacked organization,
identification, credentials, and, ultimately, utility. Telecommunications
interruptions, as occurred after 9/11, make it difficult to verify
credentials and tie up already over-burdened systems. The presence of
many, uncoordinated volunteers can actually hinder effective133
emergency response.
To address those issues, a division of HHS, Health Resources
and Services Administration, in September 2004, asked experts at the
Center for Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns
Hopkins Universities to draft a legal framework for advance
registration of volunteer health professionals, or ESAR-VHP. 13 4 The
proposed framework would allow health care providers to pre-register
through state authorities as volunteer responders thereby ensuring an
effective, trained, and coordinated mobilization of health care workers.
The ESAR-VHP proposal addresses federalism problems associated
with various states' licensure standards and public health and safety
powers, without undue encroachment of federal authority. States
would still define the standards and qualifications for licensure of
medical professionals within their respective borders but could
authorize out-of-state workers to provide care in specific situations. As
an additional nod to state sovereignty, the call for volunteers would be
triggered by the state governor's, not the president's, order or
declaration of a public health emergency.
The ESAR-VHP is merely a draft proposal, however, and work
remains to implement a widely recognized pre-registration system. A
number of states have entered interstate compacts to recognize
133 See James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Volunteer Health Professionals and Emergencies:
Assessing and Transforming the Legal Environment, 3 BIOSECURITY &
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE & SCIENCE 216-17 (2005)
(discussing legal and other challenges with utilizing volunteer health professionals).
134 See generally ESAR-VHP Draft, supra note 24.
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licensure reciprocity or similar mutual aid during declared
emergencies. 135 Even if a health care provider is waived-in or granted a
reciprocal license to practice in the state, hospitals and health care
facilities may require additional screening or credentialing before
allowing the provider to treat patients.' 36  A uniform law or
coordinating body regarding licensure and credentialing of medical
personnel would greatly improve disaster response.
Another concern with volunteer response is tort liability for
medical malpractice, especially if health care providers are treating
patients in less than optimal conditions in terms of facilities, supplies,
and staffing. Patients who are harmed by treatment delays or triage
decisions may seek to recover from medical providers. Even if
providers' treatment and resource-allocation decisions are justifiable
from a public health perspective, injured patients might nevertheless
assert that the care fell below the applicable state tort-law standard.
137
The threat of liability could deter otherwise willing volunteers.
Medical malpractice cases are a product of state tort law, specifically
negligence standards, which vary widely from state to state. Conduct
that is considered negligent in one state may be within the range of
acceptable conduct in another. Negligence cases are highly dependent
on the particular facts and circumstances, as evaluated by the jury on a
case-by-case basis. With their liability left to the reasoned judgment of
a jury of their peers evaluating the circumstances of the disaster,
potential tort defendants may take little comfort and avoid volunteer
work.
Special tort rules designed to protect good Samaritans and other
volunteers may not be available to protect emergency first
responders. 38 Although providing little comfort to medical providers,
135 See, e.g., ESAR-VHP Draft, supra note 24, at 32-34 (signed by 48 states and
several territories, recognizing license reciprocity during declared emergency, subject
to governor's limitations); Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact ("ICDDC")
(mutual aid agreement among several states for license reciprocity during enemy
attack, bioterrorism event, or natural disaster).
136 See Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations ("JCAHO")
standards for hospitals (including provisions for granting disaster privileges for out-
of-state providers on minimal proof of qualifications, e.g., hospital identification card,
current out-of-state license and valid photo i.d., willingness of another hospital
employee to vouch for the provider's identity).
137 See supra note 24 (discussing professional standard of care and relevance of
emergency circumstances in defining standard).
138 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 663-64 (2000) (suggesting that all states
have enacted Good Samaritan statutes that "reduce[ ] the duty of care otherwise owed
by license health care providers when they are rendering certain professional
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the best legal protection from liability in a public health environment is
to apply a different standard of care. The existence of an emergency is
one of the circumstances that juries can be instructed to consider in
deciding whether an actor's conduct was negligent. Likewise, juries
could be instructed to consider the physician or other medical
professional's conduct in light of the exigency of the disaster situation
and lack of usually available medical resources to adjust the
professional standard of care accordingly. That approach, however,
still exposes volunteers to the costs of defending a suit and risks of
adverse jury determinations. Therefore, merely redefining the standard
of care to reflect the circumstances of the disaster may not fully offset
liability fears from deterring volunteer response.
Alternatively, states might grant immunity from liability to
medical first responders, either by enacting new immunity protections
or extending existing governmental or official immunity to volunteers
responding to a public health emergency disaster.' 39 Or states might
indemnify volunteer health professionals, acting as a public
professional liability insurer, covering both the costs of defending
against any lawsuits that are brought and the amount of any damages
awarded to the victims. 140 Another approach to the liability concern
would be a no-fault compensation system, such as workers'
compensation or the 9/11 Victims' Compensation Fund.' 4 ' Victims
would not be allowed to sue physicians or other volunteer health care
providers but instead would receive compensation for any injuries from
a government fund.
Another issue largely unaddressed is the financial impact of
demand surge on providers' billing and accounting systems.142 The
unprecedented volume of claims, including potentially novel clinical
presentations, would tax existing coding, billing, and reimbursement
systems. The expected payment delays and denials might be
financially unsustainable on hospitals' typically thin operating margins.
assistance at the scene of an emergency occurring outside the professional's regular
practice" and surveying states' laws).
139 See ESAR-VHP Draft, supra note 24, at 44 (citing New Jersey and Maryland as
examples of states that extended governmental immunity protections to volunteers).
140 See id. at 45 (citing New York as state adopting defense and indemnity guarantees
to volunteers).
141 See supra Section II (regarding Workers' Compensation); Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, tit. IV (Victims' Compensation), Pub. L.
No 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001),
142 See generally Elizabeth A. Weeks, After the Catastrophe: Disaster Relief for
Hospitals, 85 N.C. L. REv. 223 (2006).
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The increased demand for medical care resulting from a catastrophe
seemingly would be a boon to health care providers, at least to the
extent that patients have medical insurance and insurers honored the
claims. Hospitals typically provide medical care to patients upfront and
seek payment from third-party payers after-the-fact. 143  Increased
demand for services should mean higher potential collections. But due
to a combination of factors, including existing financial strain on
hospital emergency departments; higher-than-normal level of uninsured
patients, payment delays, and administrative burdens following a
catastrophe; and the current approach to hospital payment, "a major
disaster is more likely to produce financial liabilities than lucrative
revenue streams for hospitals."144
To address the payment issue and ensure uninterrupted access to
care both during and after the disaster, policymakers should consider
implementing a federal hospital relief plan. As with other preparedness
laws, federal, rather than state, authorities should bear the financial
burden of protecting the health care infrastructure. States impacted by
a disaster would quickly exhaust their resources and be unable to offer
assistance. Moreover, the cost of ensuring continued access to care is
best spread across the nation's taxpayers. The plan could include
immediate cash assistance to cover operating costs during and
immediately after the crisis. The government should also offer
temporary financial support, in the form of "loans," to sustain hospitals
143 See DAVID DRAHOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
31-32 (2000) (describing typical third-party payment structure of employer health
insurance, noting that "[no one should expect patients to consider the cost of medical
care when insurance is paying for it," and that they "will consent to almost any
treatment recommendation"); VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH,
ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 81 (1999 expanded ed.) (discussing factors
contributing to high cost of hospital care, including fact that "[olnly a small faction..
. is paid for directly by patients; the bulk comes from so-called third parties, of which
the government is the most important, picking up over half the total bill"); JOSEPH
NEWHOUSE, PRICING THE PRICELESS 9 - 13 (2002) (describing typical patient control
over provider choice and minimal control of insurers over price); Thomas
Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Paying for Health Care, JAMA, Aug. 24, 1994, at
635-36 & fig. 2 (describing typical third-party payment structure); Elizabeth Belmont
et al., Disaster Checklist: Emergency Preparedness, Response & Recovery Checklist:
Beyond the Emergency Management Plan, 37 J. HEALTH L. 503, 547 (2004) (The
majority of income for most healthcare institutions comes from patient insurance
reimbursement (either private or government-sponsored)); SHERMAN FOLLAND ET
AL., THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 13 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that by
1997, more than 80% of health care expenditures was paid by third-party payers,
either private or government).
144 See Weeks, supra note 142, at 230 (describing hospitals' financial pressures).
[VOL.lO0.2:251
LESSONS FROM KATRINA
as they await reimbursement from private insurers, government health
care programs, and other funding sources. Finally, the government
could provide a backstop to cover the catastrophic uncompensated care
costs resulting from the crisis, similar to the uncompensated care pools
offered under individual state Medicaid waivers following Katrina.
The three-faceted approach would ensure that the immediate crisis of a
terrorist attack or natural disaster does not spiral into a lasting crisis in
availability of emergency medical care. 1
45
V. CONCLUSION
The victims of hurricane Katrina continue to face enormous challenges.
The Gulf region's pre-catastrophe overall level of poor health and
chronic disease has grown more acute as health care facilities forced to
close during the disaster due to property destruction, staffing shortages,
and other challenges struggle to reopen and resume the previous level
of services. Staffing shortages remain an issue, as many health care
workers, like other Gulf residents, are unable or choose not to return to
the flood-ravaged region. In addition, the level of destitute and
uninsured people in the area has increased dramatically since the storm,
due to loss of jobs, welfare benefits, and other social supports.
The failed government response to flood victims' medical and
other basic human needs in the wake of the disaster compel further
planning, funding, and coordination for the next public health
emergency. The importance of addressing those issues extends beyond
the next catastrophe to ongoing challenges in the nation's health care
infrastructure under normal conditions. Although federal and state
authorities have taken significant steps toward emergency medical
response preparedness, additional work remains to be done. The saving
grace, if one can be gleaned, is that the lessons learned from Katrina
145 See Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its Prevention, 3
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 30-32 (1996) (discussing pros and cons of pre- and
post-disaster relief and comparing problem of uninsured patients who cannot afford
critical care as support for pre-disaster approach) [hereinafter Levmore, Quakes];
Rosenbaum, New Directions, supra note 115, at 95 ("How to assure the availability of
accessible, timely and quality medical care in the face of terrorism and other public
health emergencies represents an enormous public health challenge"); Weeks, supra
note 142, at 296 (recommending funding approach); see generally FUCHS, supra note
143, at 13-14 (discussing access to care problems faced by particular groups in
society, the poor, urban "ghetto" dwellers, and rural population, and general access
problem faced by individuals and families lacking income or insurance to pay for
care).
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will benefit not only the floods' victims but also the public's overall
health.
